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Abstract
As social networking takes to the mobile world,
smartphone apps provide users with ever-changing ways
to interact with each other. Over the past couple of years,
an increasing number of apps have entered the market of-
fering end-to-end encryption, self-destructing messages,
or some degree of anonymity. However, little work thus
far has examined the properties they offer. To this end,
this paper presents a taxonomy of 18 of these apps: we
first look at the features they promise in their appeal to
broaden their reach and focus on 8 of the more popular
ones. We present a technical evaluation, based on static
and dynamic analysis, and identify a number of gaps be-
tween the claims and reality of their promises.
1 Introduction
Following Edward Snowden’s revelations, privacy
and anonymity technologies have been increasingly of-
ten in the news, with a growing number of users be-
coming aware – loosely speaking – of privacy and en-
cryption notions [24]. Service providers have rolled
out, or announced they will, more privacy-enhancing
tools, e.g., support for end-to-end encryption [23] and
HTTPS by default [41]. At the same time, a num-
ber of smartphone apps and mobile social networks
have entered the market, promising to offer features
like anonymity, ephemerality, and/or end-to-end encryp-
tion (E2EE). While it is not that uncommon to stumble
upon claims like “military-grade encryption” or “NSA-
proof” [16] in the description of these apps, little work
thus far has actually analyzed the guarantees they pro-
vide.
∗A preliminary version of this paper appears in the Proceedings of
the 2016 NDSS Workshop on Understanding and Enhancing Online
Privacy (UEOP). This is the full version.
This motivates the need for a systematic study of
a careful selection of such apps. To this end, we
compile a list of 18 apps that offer E2EE, anonymity
and/or ephemerality, focusing on 8 popular ones (Con-
fide, Frankly Chat, Secret, Snapchat, Telegram, Whis-
per, Wickr, and Yik Yak). We review their functionali-
ties and perform an empirical evaluation, based on static
and dynamic analysis, aimed to compare the claims of
the selected apps against results of our analysis.
Highlights of our findings include that “anonymous”
social network apps Whisper and Yik Yak actually iden-
tify users with distinct user IDs that are persistent.
Users’ previous activities are restored to their device
after they uninstall and reinstall them, and information
collected by these apps could be used to de-anonymize
users. We also find that the ephemeral-messaging app
Snapchat does not always delete messages from its
servers – in fact, previous “expired” chat messages are
surprisingly included in packets sent to the clients. Then,
we report that all actions performed by a user on Frankly
Chat can be observed from the request URL, which is ac-
tually transmitted in the clear.
1.1 Building an Apps Corpus
We start by building a list of smartphone apps that
are categorized as “anonymous” on Product Hunt [6],
and those popular among friends and colleagues. We
then look at their descriptions and at similar apps on the
Google Play, and focus on those described as offering
end-to-end encryption, anonymity and/or ephemerality,
as defined below:
• Anonymity: is defined as the property that a subject
is not identifiable within a set of subjects, known as
the anonymity set [27], e.g., as provided by Tor [15]
for anonymous communications. In the context of
this paper, the term anonymity will be used to de-
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note that users are anonymous w.r.t. other users of
the service or w.r.t. the app service provider.
• End-to-End Encryption (E2EE): Data exchanged
between two communicating parties is encrypted in
a way that only the sender and the intended recip-
ient can decrypt it, so, e.g., eavesdroppers and ser-
vice providers cannot read or modify messages.
• Ephemerality: In cryptography, it denotes the
property that encryption keys change with every
message or after a certain period. Instead, here
ephemerality is used to indicate that messages are
not available to recipients from the user interface
after a period of time [12]. For instance, in apps
like Snapchat, messages “disappear” from the app
(but may still be stored at the server) a few seconds
after they are read.
First List. Our first list contains 18 apps, listed in Ta-
ble 1, where we also report their first release date, num-
ber of downloads as reported by Google Play Store, the
kind(s) of content that can be shared via the apps (e.g.,
text, videos, files), and whether the apps create persistent
social links. Note that our first selection does not include
popular apps like WhatsApp, since it attempts, but does
not guarantee, to provide E2EE for all users [18].
1.2 Apps Selection
Among the 18 apps presented in Table 1, we then se-
lect a few popular ones, as discussed below.
Selection Criteria. From our corpus, we focus on
apps with the most downloads that offer ephemerality,
anonymity, E2EE, or, preferably, a combination of them.
We exclude Silent Circle and TigerText as they require,
respectively, paid subscription and a registered com-
pany email. We reduce our selection to 8 apps: Con-
fide, Frankly Chat, Secret, Snapchat, Telegram, Whis-
per, Wickr, and Yik Yak (bold entries in Table 1). Next,
we provide an overview of their advertised functionali-
ties, complementing information in the Table 1. (Note
that descriptions below are taken either from the Google
Play Store or the apps’ respective websites.)
Confide: offers end-to-end encryption and ephemeral-
ity. It allows users to share text, photos, and docu-
ments from their device and integrates with Dropbox and
Google Drive. It provides read receipts and notification
of screenshot capture attempts. Messages are not dis-
played on the app until the recipient “wands” over them
with a finger, so that only a limited portion of the mes-
sage is revealed at a time. After a portion of the message
is read, it is grayed out Screenshots are also disabled on
Android. Messages that have not been read are kept on
the server for a maximum of 30 days.
Frankly Chat: is a chat app allowing users to send
ephemeral messages (text, picture, video or audio),
anonymous group chats, and un-send messages that the
recipient has not opened. Messages disappear after
10 seconds but users can “pin” their chats disabling
ephemerality. Both parties do not need to have the app
installed to receive messages: a link is sent to the re-
cipient via email, when clicked, reveals the message.
Messages are deleted from the server after 24 hours—
whether they are read or not.
Secret: (discontinued May 2015) lets users post anony-
mously to other nearby users. Users can view secrets
from other locations but can only comment on those
from their nearby location. Users can chat privately with
friends and engage in a group chat with the chat history
disappearing after a period of inactivity.
Snapchat: is an app that allows users send text, pho-
tos and videos that are displayed for 1 to 10 seconds (as
set by the user) before they “disappear”, i.e., they are no
longer available to their friends. If the recipient takes
a screenshot, the sender is notified. Users can also view
Stories, i.e., a collection of snaps around the same theme,
and a so-called Discover, i.e., accessing snaps from dif-
ferent selected editorials.
Telegram: is a messaging app that lets users exchange
text, photos, videos, and files. It also provides users with
an option to engage in a “secret chat”, which provides
E2EE and optional ephemerality. Senders are notified if
the recipient takes a screenshot. Account information,
along with all messages, media, contacts stored at Tele-
gram servers are deleted after 6 months of login inactiv-
ity.
Whisper: is a location-based mobile social network that
allows users to anonymously share texts displayed atop
images, which are either selected by the users or sug-
gested by the app. Users can view and respond to whis-
pers either as a private message or via another whisper.
Wickr: is a chat app supporting text, audio, video, pho-
tos, and files, with user-defined ephemerality (maximum
6 days). It also allows users to engage in group chats,
shred deleted files securely, and prevents screenshots on
Android and claims to anonymize users by removing
metadata (such as persistent identifiers or geo-location)
from their contents.
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App Launched #Downloads Type Content Anonymity Ephemerality E2EE Social Links
20 Day Stranger 2014 Unknown Temporary OSN Photos and location Yes No No No
Armortext 2012 50–100K Chat (Enterprise) Text and files No User-defined Yes Yes
BurnerApp 2012 100–500K Temporary Call and SMS N/A N/A No Yes
numbers
Confide 2014 100–500K Chat Text, documents, photos No After message Yes Yes
is read
CoverMe 2013 100–500K Chat Text, voice, photos, videos No User-defined Yes Yes
Disposable Unknown 100–500K Temporary Call and SMS N/A N/A No Yes
Number numbers
Frankly Chat 2013 500K–1M Chat Text, pictures, videos, Optional for 10s No Yes
voice group chat
Secret 2014 5–10M Anonymous OSN, Text, photos, Yes No No Yes/No
Chat
Seecrypt SC3 2014 10–50K Chat Text, voice, files No No Yes Yes
Silent Circle 2012 100–200K Encrypted Phone Call, SMS, files No User-defined Yes Yes
Snapchat 2011 100–500M Transient OSN Photos, videos No 1 – 10s No Yes
Telegram 2013 50–100M Chat Text, photos, audio, No Optional Optional Yes
videos, files, location
TextSecure 2010 500K–1M Chat Text, files No No Yes Yes
TigerText 2010 500K–1M Chat Text, files No User-defined Yes Yes
Vidme 2013 50–100K Video Sharing Videos Yes No No No
Whisper 2012 1–5M Anonymous OSN, Text, photos Yes No No No
Chat
Wickr 2012 100–500K Chat Text, files, photos, audio, No User-defined Yes Yes
videos
Yik Yak 2013 1–5M Local Bulletin Text Yes No No No
Table 1: Our first selection of 18 smartphone apps providing at least one among ephemerality, anonymity, or end-to-end encryp-
tion. N/A denotes ‘Not Applicable’. Apps in bold constitute the focus of our analysis in Sections 2-3.
Yik Yak: is a local bulletin-board social network allow-
ing nearby users to post yaks anonymously. Users clus-
tered within a 10-mile radius are considered local and
can post, view, reply to, and up/down vote yaks but can
only view yaks outside their locality.
2 Static Analysis
We now present the results of a static analysis of the 8
apps, aiming to analyze SSL/TLS implementations and
look for potential information leakage.
2.1 Methodology
We perform static analysis using dex2jar [1], decom-
piling the .apk files to .jar files, from which we extract
the related Java classes using JD-GUI [5]. We then
search for SSL/TLS keywords like TrustManager [9],
HostnameVerifier [3], SSLSocketFactory [7], and
HttpsURLConnection [4]. Then, we inspect the
TrustManager and HostnameVerifier interfaces used
to accept or reject a server’s credentials: the former man-
ages the certificates of all Certificate Authorities (CAs)
used in assessing a certificate’s validity, while the latter
performs hostname verification whenever a URL’s host-
name does not match the hostname in the certificate.
2.2 Results
Several sockets are usually created to transport data to
different hostnames in an app, therefore, sockets in an
app may have different SSL implementations. We ob-
serve different SSL implementations in the 8 apps, and
summarize our findings below.
Non-Customized SSL Implementation. App de-
velopers can choose to use any one of five defined
HostnameVerifier subclass for hostname verifi-
cation, and use TrustManager initialized with a
keystore of CA certificates trusted by the Android
OS to determine whether a certificate is valid or
not, or customize certificate validation by defining
their own logic for accepting or rejecting a certifi-
cate. All the 8 apps in our corpus contain some
non-customized SSL implementations. Telegram and
Yik Yak only use non-customized SSL code, with the
former relying on BrowserCompatHostnameVerifier
class and building sockets from default
SSLSocketFactory. Confide and Snapchat both
use the BrowserCompatHostnameVerifier class, while
Wickr has instances of all HostnameVerifier sub-
classes but uses the BrowserCompatHostnameVerifier
class on most of its sockets. Snapchat does not cus-
tomize its TrustManager either and registers a scheme
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from the default SocketFactory. Secret uses sockets
from the default SSLSocketFactory but employs regex
pattern matching for hostname verification.
Vulnerable TrustManager/HostnameVerifier.
Frankly Chat, Whisper, and Wickr all contain
TrustManager and HostnameVerifier that ac-
cept all certificates or hostnames. Alas, this makes
it possible for an adversary to perform Man-in-
The-Middle (MiTM) attacks and retrieve informa-
tion sent on the sockets that use the vulnerable
TrustManager and/or HostnameVerifier. Vulnerable
HostnameVerifier in Frankly Chat returns true
without performing any check, while Wickr uses the
AllowAllHostnameVerifier subclass which is also
used in Whisper by Bugsense crash reporter.
Certificate Pinning. Confide, Frankly Chat, and Whis-
per implement certificate pinning. Confide pins the ex-
pected CA certificate which is also accessible from the
decompiled apk, whereas, Whisper uses the hash of the
pinned certificate appended with the domain name to
make certificate validation decisions. For Frankly Chat,
a single certificate is expected and its hash is checked for
in the received certificate chain. Frankly Chat also ini-
tialize another TrustManager with a keystore that loads
certificate from file.
3 Dynamic Analysis
Next, we present the results of our dynamic analysis
aimed to scrutinize features “promised” by the 8 apps in
our corpus, as well as to confirm whether the vulnerabil-
ities found statically are also observed dynamically.
3.1 Experimental Setup
We conduct our experiments on a LG Nexus 4 running
Android 5.1, connected to a Wi-Fi access point under our
control. (Note that the Wi-Fi network was secured using
WPA2 to prevent unauthorized connections and ensure
that only intended traffic was captured.) Our intention
is to examine what a random attacker can access from
an app advertised as privacy-enhancing, and what can be
deduced as regards privacy-enhancing claims. Hence,
we assume an adversary that cannot elevate her privilege
nor have access to a rooted device. We perform actions
including sign-up, login, profile editing, sending/reading
messages, while monitoring traffic transmitted and re-
ceived by the apps. We collect traffic using Wireshark
and analyze unencrypted traffic to check for sensitive
information transmitted in the clear. We also rely on
HTTP proxies such as Fiddler [2] and SSLSplit [8] to
mount Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM) attacks and decrypt
HTTPS traffic. Proxying is supported in two ways:
1. Regular Proxy: We install the Fiddler HTTP
proxy [2] on a Windows 8.1 laptop (which also acts
as Wi-Fi access point), listening on port 8888, and
manually configure the smartphone to connect to
the proxy. Figure 1(a) illustrates our proxy setup
using Fiddler. We also install Fiddler’s CA certifi-
cate on the smartphone and laptop to allow HTTPS
traffic decryption.
2. Transparent Proxy: Some Android apps are pro-
grammed to ignore proxy settings, so Fiddler does
not accept/forward their packets. This happens with
Telegram, Wickr (non-CSS/JS), and Frankly Chat
(chat packets). Therefore, we set up a transpar-
ent proxy as shown in Figure 1(b) using SSLsplit
MiTM proxy [8] set to listen on port 9014 on a
Linux desktop running Fedora 22, which also acts
as a Wi-Fi access point. We use iptables to redirect
to port 9014 all traffic to ports 80, 443, and 5228
(GCM). As SSLsplit uses a CA certificate to gener-
ate leaf certificates for the HTTPS servers each app
connects to, we generate and install a CA certificate
on the smartphone, and pass it to SSLsplit running
on the Linux machine.
3.2 Results
We now present the results of our dynamic analysis,
which are also summarized in Table 2.
No Proxy. We start by simply analyzing traffic captured
by Wireshark and observe that Secret and Frankly Chat
send sensitive information in the clear. Specifically, in
Frankly Chat, the Android advertising ID (a unique iden-
tifier) is transmitted in the clear, via an HTTP GET re-
quest, along with Device Name. The list of actions a user
performs on Frankly Chat can also be observed from the
request URL. Secret instead leaks Google Maps location
requests (and responses) via HTTP GET.
Regular Proxy. Using Fiddler as a MiTM proxy, we no-
tice that Confide and Whisper do not complete connec-
tion with their servers due to certificate pinning. Note
that Whisper started implementing pinning after an up-
date on April 22, 2015. Prior to that, one could cap-
ture Whisper traffic via Fiddler and access location and
4
(a) Proxy Setup Using Fiddler. (b) Proxy Setup Using SSLSplit.
Figure 1: Dynamic Analysis Setup.
user ID. We also notice that Frankly Chat hashes pass-
words using MD5 without salt, while Snapchat sends
usernames and passwords without hashing. Although
inconsistently, Snapchat also sends previous “expired”
chat messages to the other party even though these are
not displayed on the UI.1
Decrypted traffic from Secret, Whisper, and Yik Yak
show that these apps associate unique user IDs to each
user, respectively, ClientId, wuid, and user ID. We test
the persistence of these IDs and find that, even if the
apps’ cache on the device is cleared through the Android
interface, and the apps uninstalled and reinstalled, Whis-
per and Yik Yak retain the user ID from the uninstalled
account and restore all previous whispers and yaks from
the account. On Whisper, we manually delete its wuid
and state files (in the /sdcard/whisper directory) before
reinstalling the app: this successfully clears all previous
whispers and a new wuid file is generated. However,
it does not completely de-associate the device from the
“old” account as the “new” account would still get noti-
fications of private messages from conversations started
by the “old” account. On the contrary, clearing Secret’s
cache unlinks previous messages, even without unin-
stalling the app.
Telegram and Wickr ignore the proxy settings, i.e.,
traffic does not pass through our proxy. Frankly Chat
also ignore the proxy when sending chat messages but
not for traffic generated by other actions.
Transparent Proxy. Using SSLSplit, we decrypt SSL-
encrypted traffic from Wickr and Telegram. We do not
find any sensitive information or chat messages being
transmitted as the traffic is indeed encrypted. Apps for
which SSL-encrypted traffic is recovered using Fiddler
1 Note: we have informed Snapchat of this in October 2015.
App Fiddler SSLSplit
Confide No connection No connection
Frankly
Chat
TLS traffic is decrypted
but packets containing
chat messages not
routed through proxy
TLS traffic is decrypted
but there is no connec-
tion to the server when
chat is attempted
Secret All packets decrypted Not Available (dis-
continued before
we started using the
transparent proxy)
Snapchat All packets decrypted All packets decrypted
Telegram Connects but traffic
does not pass through
proxy
TLS traffic is decrypted
but E2EE is enabled
Whisper No connection No connection
Wickr Connects but traffic
does not pass through
proxy
TLS traffic is decrypted
but E2EE is enabled
Yik Yak All packets decrypted All packets decrypted
Table 2: Summary of Dynamic Analysis Results.
exhibit the same behavior on the transparent proxy, with
Confide and Whisper not connecting due to pinning. We
observe that certificate pinning is implemented on the
socket used to transmit chat messages on Frankly Chat,
as we cannot send chat messages but perform other ac-
tions, e.g., editing profiles and adding new friends. We
also uninstall the CA certificate from the device to ob-
serve whether non-trusted certificate are accepted, and
find that none of the apps established an HTTPS con-
nection, which implies the apps do not use TrustMangers
accepting any certificate as valid as reported in [17, 25].
4 Discussion
We now discuss the implications of our analysis, in
light of the properties promised by the 8 studied apps.
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Anonymity w.r.t. other users. Posts on Secret and Yik
Yak (resp., secrets and yaks) are not displayed along with
any identifier, thus making users anonymous w.r.t. other
users. Whereas, on Whisper, due to the presence of a dis-
play name (non-unique identifier shown to other users)
and its “Nearby” function, communities can be formed
as a result of viewing and responding to whispers from
nearby locations. Thus, it may be possible to link whis-
pers to a display name, while at the same time querying
the distance to the target, as highlighted in [39].
A user who thinks is anonymous is more likely to
share sensitive content she might not share on non-
anonymous OSN platforms, which makes “anonymous”
apps potential targets of scammers/blackmailers that can
identify users. This motivates us to examine the possi-
bility of creating social links between users, i.e., linking
a user and a set of actions. We find that this is not possi-
ble on Yik Yak as there are no one-to-one conversations.
Also, when the Yik Yak stream is monitored by a non-
participating user, user IDs observed are symbolic to the
real unique user ID. The symbolic user ID is only asso-
ciated to one yak, hence one cannot use it to link a user
as the ID differs across yaks by the same user. Frankly
Chat optionally offers k-anonymity during a group chat
with k+1 friends. Due to the social link already present
in the group (users chat with friends), psychological dif-
ferences make it possible to identify who says what.
Anonymity w.r.t. service provider. All apps asso-
ciate identifiers to its users, which allows them to link
each user across multiple sessions. Wickr claims to
strip any metadata that could allow them to identify their
users, thereby making users anonymous and impossible
to track [40], but we cannot verify this claim since all
traffic is encrypted end-to-end.
We observe different levels of persistence of user IDs
in Secret, Whisper, and Yik Yak, as mentioned earlier.
Secret stores identifiers on users’ device, so an identi-
fier would cease to persist beyond data and cache clear-
ance. Whereas, for Whisper and Yik Yak, we have two
hypotheses as to why user IDs survive when the app is
uninstalled and later reinstalled: either they store iden-
tifiers on their servers and restore them to a device on
re-installation, or they create the user IDs from the same
device information using a deterministic function. This
observation indicates that Whisper and Yik Yak’s user
IDs are linked to device information, thus making users
persistently linkable. While Whisper and Yik Yak do
reveal the information they collect from users in their
privacy policy, previous work shows that the overwhelm-
ing majority of users do not read (or anyway understand)
privacy policies [20]. Both apps collect information in-
cluding device ID, IP address, geo-location, which can
be used to track users. This, along with profiles from an-
alytics providers (which both apps embed), can be used
to de-anonymize users’ age, gender, and other traits with
a high degree of accuracy [30]. Finally, note that Whis-
per’s description on Google Play, while including terms
like ‘anonymous profiles’ and ‘anonymous social net-
work’, is actually ambiguous as to whether they refer
to anonymity w.r.t to Whisper or other users (or both).
Location Restriction. Secret and Yik Yak’s restriction
on feeds a user can see (and interact with) can simply
be defeated, e.g., as Android lets users to use mock loca-
tions in developer mode. In combination with an app that
feeds GPS locations chosen by the user (e.g., Fake GPS),
this allow them to access geo-tagged messages from any-
where.
Ephemerality. Confide, Frankly Chat, Snapchat, Tele-
gram, and Wickr offer message ephemerality with vary-
ing time intervals. Confide claims messages disappear
after it is read once [13] but this is not the case as mes-
sages only ”disappear” after a user navigates away. This
implies the recipient can keep the message for longer
as long as they do not navigate away from the opened
message. In Frankly Chat, messages “disappear” af-
ter 10 seconds (even though users can pin messages).
Ephemerality on Telegram only applies to “secret chats”
and the expiration time is defined by the user. Snapchat
and Wickr also let users determine how long their mes-
sage last, with Snapchat defining a range of 1–10s (de-
fault 3s). On Snapchat, previous chat messages are actu-
ally part of the response received from the server, even
though they are not displayed on the client’s UI. This in-
dicates that read messages are actually not deleted from
Snapchat servers immediately, despite what is stated
in Snapchat’s privacy policy [32]. Since Confide and
Frankly Chat implement certificate pinning, we cannot
examine if responses from the server during chat contain
past messages. Also, Telegram and Wickr encrypt data
before transmission, thus we cannot make any analysis
from intercepted packets.
Of all the apps offering ephemerality, only Confide
and Wickr instruct the Android OS to prevent screen
capture from a recipient. Obviously, however, the re-
cipient can still take a photo with another camera, and
video recording would defeat Confide’s wand-based ap-
proach. Confide can claim to offer plausible deniability
if a photo is taken, as messages are not displayed along
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with the name of the sender, hence, pictures would not
preserve the link between the message and the identity of
the sender. Frankly Chat, Snapchat, and Telegram only
notify the sender that the recipient has taken a screen-
shot, thus ephemerality claims are only valid assuming
the recipient is not willing to violate a social contract
between them and the sender. Also, if messages are not
completely wiped from the server, the provider is obvi-
ously still subject to subpoena and/or vulnerable to hack-
ing.
End-to-End Encryption. Confide and Wickr claim to
employ E2EE by default, using AES-128 and AES-256,
respectively. We can confirm E2EE in Wickr but not in
Confide, since certificate pinning prevents interception
of traffic. Also, Telegram offers E2EE for “secret chat”
using AES-256 and client-server encryption (i.e. only
the server and both clients can decrypt traffic) which
also prevents MiTM attacks for non-secret chats. In
both secret and non-secret chat, Telegram uses a propri-
etary protocol, MTProto, and transmit traffic over SSL
although its webpage states otherwise.2 Telegram and
Wickr’s implementations also claim to support perfect
forward secrecy [35, 40].
Finally, note that recent criticism of Telegram’s secu-
rity in the press3 do not affect the claims of Telegram
that we choose to analyze, i.e., E2EE and ephemerality
in “secret chats.”
5 Related Work
This section reviews related work, specifically, (i)
measurement studies of chat apps and location-based so-
cial networks, (ii) apps vulnerabilities, and (iii) investi-
gations of users’ behavior.
Measurement-based studies. Wang et al. [39] analyze
user interaction in Whisper, motivated by the absence
of persistent social links, content moderation, and user
engagement. They also highlight a vulnerability that al-
lows an attacker to detect a user’s location by attaching
a script to a whisper querying Whisper’s DB. Correa et
al. [14] define the concept of anonymity sensitivity for
social media posts and measure it across non-anonymous
(e.g., Twitter) and anonymous (e.g., Whisper) services,
aiming to study linguistic differences between anony-
mous and non-anonymous social media sites as well as
to analyze content posted on anonymous social media
2 https://core.telegram.org/mtproto#http-transport
3 http://preview.tinyurl.com/ntahv65
and the extent user demographics affect perception and
measurements of sensitivity. Peddinti et al. [26] analyze
users’ anonymity choices during their activity on Quora,
identifying categories of questions for which users are
more likely to seek anonymity. They also perform an
analysis of Twitter to study the prevalence and behav-
ior of so-called “anonymous” and “identifiable” users,
as classified by Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, and
find a correlation between content sensitivity and a user’s
choice to be anonymous. Stuzman et al. [34] observe a
significant growth in anonymity-seeking behavior on on-
line social media in 2013, while Roesner et al. [29] an-
alyze why people use Snapchat: they survey 127 adults
and find that privacy is not the major driver of adoption,
but the “fun” of self-destructing messages.
Flaws. Prior work has also looked at related apps’ secu-
rity flaws: in late 2013, researchers from Gibson Secu-
rity discovered a flaw in Snapchat’s API that allows an
adversary to reconstruct Snapchat’s user base (including
names, aliases, phone numbers) within one day and mass
creation of bogus accounts [38]. Zimmerman [42] high-
lights the issue of linkability of anonymous identifiers in
Wickr. Recently, Unger et al. [36] systematize security
and usability of chat and call apps providing end-to-end
encryption. Also, prior work [17, 25, 33] has studied li-
braries, interfaces, classes, and methods used by apps to
make security decisions, specifically, w.r.t. vulnerabili-
ties in sockets used to transmit user data.
User Behavior. Pielot and Oliver [28] study the moti-
vations behind the use of Snapchat by teenagers. They
create two personas and, by engaging with other users,
they find that teens use Snapchat as they are excited by
the ephemerality, see fewer risks, and non-commitment
to persistent messengers. Roesner et al. [29] analyze
why people use Snapchat: they survey 127 adults and
find that security and privacy are not the major drivers of
adoption, but rather the “fun” of self-destructing mes-
sages. Hosseinmardi et al. [19] look at cyberbully-
ing on a semi-anonymous network, i.e., last.fm, while
Stuzman et al. [34] observe a significant growth in
anonymity-seeking behavior on online social media in
2013. Shein [31] interview a few experts and com-
mented on the rise of apps for “ephemeral data” (e.g.,
Snapchat, Gryphn, Wickr), pointing out that users do not
use ephemeral messaging because they have something
to hide, rather, because they do not want to add digital
artifacts to their digital “detritus.”
Privacy Perceptions. Liu et al. [22] measured the dis-
crepancy between desired and actual privacy settings of
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Facebook users, with a user study involving 200 partic-
ipants. Authors found that perception matched reality
only 37% of the time, and that default settings were used
for 36% of the profiles. Ayalon and Toch [10] investi-
gated the relationship between information sharing, in-
formation aging, and privacy. They conducted a survey
of 193 Facebook users and posited that relevance, will-
ingness to share/alter posts decreases with time. They
also found that users are more willing to share recent
than old events. While Kraus et al. [21] focus on users’
perception of security and privacy on smartphones, it re-
veals psychological effects that are seen as threats from
users’ perspective that are usually not considered by mit-
igation developers. Finally, Bauer et al. [11] studied the
relationship of time and information relevance and pri-
vacy and found that Facebook users were not really in-
terested in the concept of ephemeral data.
6 Conclusion
With recent reports of government snooping and in-
creasingly detrimental hacks, more and more apps have
entered the market advertised as providing some privacy
features. As some of these are now used by millions of
users, we set to study more carefully the features they
offer. More specifically, we presented an analysis of 8
popular social networking apps namely Confide, Frankly
Chat, Secret, Snapchat, Telegram, Whisper, Wickr, and
Yik Yak that are marketed as offering some privacy prop-
erties. Starting from a taxonomy of 18 apps, we focused
on 8 of them due to their popularity. We performed a
functional, static, and dynamic analysis, aiming to ana-
lyze the properties promised by the apps.
We found that anonymous social networks Whisper
and Yik Yak actually identify their users with distinct
IDs that are persistent as previous activities like chats,
whispers and yaks are restored to the device even if
the user uninstalls and reinstalls the app. This behavior
shows that, although they do not require users to provide
their email or phone number, they can still persistently
link – and possibly de-anonymize – users. We also high-
lighted that, while Snapchat promises that messages will
“disappear” after 10 seconds, they are not immediately
deleted from its servers, as old messages are actually in-
cluded in responses sent to the clients. Finally, we con-
firmed that apps such as Telegram and Wickr do offer
end-to-end encrypted chat messaging.
In future work, we plan to extend the analysis to more
apps. We downloaded the metadata of 1.4 million apps
using PlayDrone’s measurements [37] and found 455
apps that might be offering anonymity, ephemerality, or
end-to-end encryption. As it would be demanding to
manually evaluate them as we did in this paper, we will
explore how to automate the analysis.
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